VALAR WATCH
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374 facts · 512 sources · updated 2026-09-30

Claims vs Record disc-009

documented conflictsafety 'No dose at the site boundary', said the state lab director; Valar's own worst case gives a small dose there, judged against non-zero guideline figures

What was said

What the record shows

The gap: The state lab's director told local readers that companies must show no dose at the site boundary in an accident and that the public would 'never see a dose of radiation above background'. Valar's own worst-case analysis, deliberately extreme, gives an upper bound at the 400 m boundary of 100 millirem (with an earlier, looser preliminary bound of 0.5 rem) and judges it against a 25 rem evaluation guideline and a 1 rem figure the paper labels USNRC NPUF (the NRC's emergency-planning-zone test for research reactors it licenses), not zero. The small size of the dose is not in dispute; the stated requirement and the 'no dose' description are. Our check: the 400 m dispersion factor behind the 100 millirem is 3.1 to 12.3 times lower than standard rural methods give; rescaled, the bound would be about 0.31 to 1.23 rem, still far below 25 rem.
In plain termsIn a worst-case accident, Valar's own paper estimates that someone at the edge of the site would get less than 100 millirem of radiation, about one year of the natural background everyone in central Utah already receives. The scenario is built to be extreme; the paper says it 'substantially exceeds any realistic release scenario.' That is small, and far under the figures the paper measures it against (a 25 rem evaluation guideline, and a 1 rem figure the paper labels USNRC NPUF, the NRC's emergency-planning-zone test for research reactors it licenses). But the state lab's director told local readers that companies are required to show 'no dose' at the boundary, and that the public would never get a dose above background. That is not the rule the paper follows and not what its numbers say. Whether he meant routine operation or a different standard is not in the record.

Why it matters: Public statements from the officials hosting the reactor should match the numbers in its safety paper; the looser figure is the one the paper uses to justify on-site-only emergency planning.

What would settle it: The final boundary dose in the approved DSA (FOIA to DOE Idaho Operations Office); GRAMA to the Utah Office of Energy Development for any USREL requirement of 'no dose' at the fence.

facts safe-013, safe-015, loc-035, safe-016 · checked 2026-09-29: Defence pass 2026-09-29: Defended: re-read ETV 10 Oct 2025 (the director's words are explicit: 'during an accident event' and 'above background'), NSDA pp. 11, 14, 32-38, 54. The earlier 'stated two ways' point was withdrawn: <0.5 rem and <100 mrem are both upper bounds and consistent, and the looser one is the cautious choice for the emergency-planning argument. The conflict between the official's description of the requirement and the paper survives. Summary line rewritten to the paper's exact bound ('<1 mSv (100 mrem)'). | Earlier verify pass: Re-read on 2026-09-29: ETV 10 Oct 2025 (quotes exact), NSDA pp. 11, 32, 37-38, 54, CX p. 5. The director's words rest on one news report. | Correction 2026-09-29 (calculation audit): Table 4's 1 rem now labelled 'USNRC NPUF' and matched to the NRC EPZ test (10 CFR 50.33(g)(2)); 'still air' now light wind in stable air; gap adds the 400 m dispersion-factor check. | Correction 2026-09-29 (wording review): the 25 rem and 1 rem figures are no longer called limits; the director's reported words and the paper's figures are set side by side; verification wording updated ('summary line').